A considerable level of anti-Russian sentiments in China is possible. This might come as a surprise for some people considering that both countries historically share a strong international and geopolitical relationship. However, in a paper that investigated the motivation behind consumer-centered activism involving Chinese respondents, it has been found that there is a sizeable portion of the Chinese population who might be willing to engage in the boycott of Russian goods.
Study: Willingness to Boycott Russian Goods in China
The government of China has refused to condemn the violence in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and has even strengthened its economic and diplomatic ties with the Russian government under Vladimir Putin. Furthermore, with regard to public sentiments, more recent surveys showed that most Chinese people hold a positive view of Russia despite its war with Ukraine.
Findings from the paper by researchers Barbara Yoxon, Xue Bai, and R. Q. Turcsányi revealed a different insight. It appears that a sizeable minority of the Chinese population might not agree with the official stance of the Chinese Community Party despite extensive propaganda and censorship. This comes from an original survey data from 3029 respondents in China.
The original data was collected as part of the Sinophone Borderlands: Interaction at the Edges project of Palacky University Olomouc in the Czech Republic. The project aims to understand the patterns of political engagement of China with its neighbors through a collaboration of different researchers from the fields of humanities, social sciences, and political science.
Nevertheless, in the specific paper of Yoxon et al., the findings suggest that there is potential for anti-Russian political action in China and that more organized anti-Russian and pro-Ukrainian campaigns are possible in the future. This would have the scope to disrupt the profit margins of Russian companies hoping to escape economic sanctions by Western countries.
About 5.1 percent of Chinese imports in 2023 were Russian consumer goods. This might seem a small figure but it is important to consider that China is home to about 1.5 billion consumers. Russia has pivoted more toward China for its exports. A small decrease in the trade volume between the two countries would result in significant losses for Russian companies.
Boycott and Buycott Motivations
Yoxon et al. focused on the interaction between political ideology and political consumerism instead of the usual ethnocentric and nationalistic routes to determine the group that is most likely to participate in activities that go against the ideological status quo in China. Three broad leanings were identified. These are liberals, neo-authoritarians, and the new left.
Results indicated that the group with liberal leanings, which shows higher support for free market policies and lower support for social authoritarianism, is more likely than others to express willingness to boycott Russian goods and are more prone to embrace a more evident anti-Russian stance not only in their consumption patterns but also in their geopolitical views.
The paper argues that the liberal group of Chinese individuals is more supportive of the liberal international order and believes that both Russia and China should work with, rather than against, multilateral state and non-state actors. It added that Chinese liberals are more prone to interpret the actions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Eastern Europe as defensive.
Findings from the same paper suggest that neo-authoritarians and the new left are less probable to support the boycott of Russian goods. The neo-authoritarians favor the current sociopolitical systems but advocate for free market change. They contend that the rivalry between the liberal United States and authoritarian China is reflected in the Russian-Ukrainian war.
The new left, on the other hand, believes that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the liberal international order are a product of the neocolonial domination of the United States. This critical stance influences them to favor Russian goods. Their consumption pattern reflects their symbolic resistance to Western hegemony and opposition to perceived imperialist policies.
Anti-Russian Sentiment Instances
It is worth noting that anti-Russian sentiments in China are still trivial compared to the prevailing pro-Russian sentiments that are fueled by the historical relationship between the two countries and the shared greater anti-Western sentiments that have been hammered down and driven home by both the Chinese and the Russian governments through state-controlled media.
However, in several instances, the Chinese public has openly criticized Russia. These have been noted down by Mu Chunshan, a journalist based in China, in his 2021 opinion article published in The Diplomat. One example was when the Russian embassy in China angered the public after publishing a picture of Chinese soldiers against the backdrop of the Japanese flag.
A large number of protests also ensued following a social media post by the Russian media that depicted a disputed territory as part of India. There was also public anger after it posted about the commemoration of the founding of the area of Vladivostok. These public relations blunders suggest that the impression of Chinese people toward Russia can readily worsen.
Liberalism in China is also alive. The Economist wrote that it may even be drawing more adherents despite intense clampdown. Findings from the studies of Stanford professors Jennifer Pan and Yiqing Xu also showed that not all Chinese are supportive of current government policies and wealthier and more educated ones tend to be more liberal and non-nationalistic.
Then there is the issue of limiting the no-limit alliance with Russia. Guangyi Pan wrote in The Conversation that the Chinese government has taken a more cautious relationship with Russia beginning in 2024 because it does not want to be seen as an enabler of the war and in consideration of the fact that experts have warned of its overdependence on Russian trade.
FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES
- Chunshan, M. 2021. “China’s Public Opinion is Shifting Away From Russia.” The Diplomat. Available online
- Yoxon, B., Bai, X., and Turcsányi, R. Q. “Willingness to Boycott Russian Goods in China: How Political Ideology Shapes Consumer Preferences in an Authoritarian Context.” Journal of Contemporary China. 1-20). Informa UK Limited. DOI: 1080/10670564.2024.2427941
- Pan, G. 2024. “Why China Now Wants to Put Some Limits on its ‘No Limits’ Friendship with Russia. The Conversation. Available online
- Pan, J. and Xu, Y. 2020. “Gauging Preference Stability and Ideological Constraint Under Authoritarian Rule.” 21st Century China Center Research Paper. Elsevier BV. DOI: 2139/ssrn.3679076
- Pan, J. and Xu, Y. 2018. “China’s Ideological Spectrum.” The Journal of Politics. 80(1): 254-273. University of Chicago Press. DOI: 1086/694255
- The Economist. 2024. “Liberalism is Far From Dead in China.” The Economist. Available online